Abstract: Calls to improve customer participation as a key element of smart grids have reinvigorated interest in demand-side features such as load control for residential users. For the load control problems, a pricing scheme based Nash Q-learning load controller is proposed. It considers a game with some non-cooperative energy equipments. The energy pricing scheme is introduced to the design of the reward value in the learning process of Q-learning. Because of the uncertainties and highly time-varying, the Nash Q-learning, which is independent of mathematic model, is adopted to deal with the incomplete information for smart grid. By means of learning procedures, the proposed controller can learn to take the best actions to regulate the energy usage for equipments with the features of high comfortable for energy usage and low electric charge meanwhile. Simulation results show that the proposed load controller can promote the performance energy usage in smart grids.
INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, pressures to increase competition and improve reliability have led to an increasing push for demand-side participation in smart grids. By suitably adjusting the energy prices, electrical load can be shifted from periods of high or peak demand to other periods, thereby reducing the ratio of peak to average loads [1, 2] . According to [3] , demand response can be defined as the changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time. But, demand response also faces several decision-making challenges [4] . Each decision implicitly requires the consumer to estimate what future energy prices may be and weigh this differential cost against the dis-utility of waiting. Thereby, load control algorithms are a necessary part of demand response. A major problem here is the lack of information related to the different characteristics of consumer energy usage fashion and device. The existing load control schemes that allow demand-side participation, including numerous parameters physical load which produces the problem of calculation and information collection [5] . However, it has been revealed to devising a mathematical model for energy usage is a very difficult task. In order to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, the energy management scheme with learning capability has been employed [6] . But the priori-knowledge for training the parameters in the controller is hard to achieve for electricity grid. In this case, Q-learning, which obtains the knowledge through trial-and-error and interaction with environment to improve its behavior policy, shows its particular superiority [7] . In this paper, we proposed a Nash Q-learning load controller considered the residential users with competitive or non-cooperative electric devices existing by introducing the pricing scheme. In the controller proposed, each user has a separate memory structure to explicitly implement its own objectives to achieve Nash equilibrium Q-values. The Nash equilibrium solution serves as the optimal energy usage for electric devices. By means of learning procedures, the controller adjusts the energy usage to the optimal value to reduce the electric charge for energy usage and promote the comfortable for the energy usage meanwhile.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Architecture of the Proposed Controller
The architecture of the proposed controller is shown in Figure 1 . It has the regulation ability in demand response process. In the controller proposed, each learning agent in electric device has a separate memory structure to explicitly implement its own objectives to achieve energy allocation as high as possible. However, all agents have incomplete but perfect information, meaning agents do not know other agents' reward functions and state transition probabilities, but they can observe other agents' immediate payoffs and actions taken previously. By way of multi-agent policy-search learning, the proposed controller uses joint-action learning algorithms to learn values for joint actions, so that it could converge to Nash equilibrium and avoid the bias in individual action decision.
Architecture of the Reward Signal
In this paper, the load control model is composed of M non-cooperative electric devices. All the devices want to have the maximum energy allocation. For the purpose of having good performance, the pricing scheme is introduced in the load control. In order to reach the co-ordination of supply and demand, the load controller sets different level of price for different kinds of devices. In this paper, the energy demands for electric devices are divided into two classes by different demand sensitivities. One is uncontrollable with constant, price. The other is controllable, the price of which is determined by the supply of energy.
The curves of the two pricing scheme
The curves of two pricing scheme are shown in Figure 2 , where D is the maximum supply of energy, * d is the desired demand of energy which is equal the optimal supply, p is the reference price determined by the load controller. For the kind of device 2, when the demand is larger than the desired value * d , the price is increased rapidly along with the increasing of the demand. For device 2, the price is given as following
where p is the punish function given to the device by the load controller considered the situation of smart grid. It is defined as
In the Q-learning based learning process, the reward value r is the only information for the controller to judge whether the energy allocation taken is good or bad, so it is vital to choose an appropriate r . In this paper, based on the requirement and experience of the demand and the pricing scheme, the reward function is the income for device m working at the energy allocation m u , it is determined by the device working pattern and the users' feeling. In this paper, we take the form as [8] ( ) log
In equation (3), r′ is the factor reflected the situation of energy usage, it has the form as following 
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can be thought that the control result is good. Otherwise, r′ is in the range (0,1) , the larger r′ is, the better control affects.
Design of Nash Q-learning Load Controller
Q-learning is a value learning version of model-free reinforcement learning that learns utility values (Q-values) of state and action pairs [9] . The objective of Q-learning is to estimate Q-values for an optimal strategy. In general form, an M-agent is defined by a tuple , , M S 1 1 , , , 
, , , 
, , , β ∈ is the discount factor, if β is large, systems will easily tend to follow the current strategy so that it will not have more opportunities to find a better strategy; if β is small, systems will not easily follow a strategy so that it will do explorations all the time. This will cause the convergence rate to be slow. On the other hand, [0, 1) α ∈ is the learning rate. The convergence rate is determined by the value of α . If α is small, the convergence rate will be slow but it will easily tend to stabilize. If α is large, the convergence rate will be fast but it will not easily tend to stabilize. The learning rate α should satisfy the following conditions . The convergence proof requires a basic assumption that every state and action should be visited infinitely often [10] . The result that Nash Q-learning process converges to Nash Q-values is obtained as following [11, 12] . Theorem. If the mapping P t :Q Q satisfies , where 0< <1 and t 0 converging to zero with probability 1, then the iteration defined by
converges to Nash optimal Q-value Q * with probability 1.
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present a numerical example of the proposed controller. As expected, the proposed load controller has the desired demand response behavior, shifting the time of operation and allocation of energy in response to pricing signals.
In the simulation scenario, there are four kinds of electric devices. D1 is the uncontrollable device as device 1 in Fig.  2 . D2, D3, and D4 are the controllable devices as device 2 in Fig. 2 . The income functions for D2, D3, and D4 are selected as
, and 3 ( ) lg U u u u = ⋅ . In the simulation process, the electric devices generate energy demands randomly and there still have demands waiting to be met all the time. Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows a representative aggregate consumer selection trace and associated aggregate energy control policy trace and illustrates the desired DR behavior. The vertical axis is in normalized energy units and the horizontal axis units of time. The upper plot is of the total energy selected by the consumer in time t . The lower plot is the total energy allocated by the load controller at time t . In time period one, the controller estimate that current energy prices are lower than future prices. So the optimal control policy allocates approximately the quantity of consumer device requiring. In time period two, the controller estimate that current energy prices are higher than future prices. So the optimal control policy defers allocating the energy until several periods later. After the learning process is being executed 6000 steps, the statistics of probability of action selection for devices is shown in Figure 5 . From the simulation result we can see that the devices have the ability to select higher working rated power as possible as they can by the adjusting scheme of proposed controller.
CONCLUSION
In the demand response of electricity grid, the reactive scheme could not accurately respond to a time-varying environment due to the lack of prediction capability. In order to cope with the load control problems in smart grid, the pricing scheme based Nash Q-learning load controller is proposed. Considering the existing of non-cooperative devices, the pricing scheme is introduced in the design of the reward function of Nash Q-learning. Through a proper training process, the proposed controller can learn empirically without prior information on the environmental dynamics. The energy usage of electric devices can be determined by the well-trained Nash Q-values. Simulation results have shown that the proposed method can increase the utilization of the energy.
